Global Games and Coups
Methods: Global games, structural estimation, political economy, econometrics
This theoretical and empirical project develops an estimable global-games model of coups d’état, separating feasibility (coordination) from desirability (payoffs). We bridge economics and political science and bring the model to data to quantify the mechanisms behind coup success.
The Political Economy of Building Regulation
Methods: Administrative data, satellite imagery, causal inference
Combining administrative records with satellite imagery, I study Egypt’s nationwide building freeze to quantify how abrupt regulatory shocks shift formal and informal construction. The project documents adaptation margins under limited state capacity and speaks to the effectiveness and limits of enforcement-heavy regulation.
Institutional Reform and Public Sector Efficiency
Methods: Causal inference, panel data analysis
Using contract-level procurement data and the staggered rollout of Public Investment Management Assessments (PIMAs), I estimate the causal impact of external diagnostics on procurement outcomes and efficiency, isolating changes attributable to the assessments rather than secular trends.